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Worldview and
Culture

Leadership in
Sub-Sahara
Africa

Betsie Smith

The traditional worldview and culture of Africa was very different from that of
the West today: man was at the center of a religious universe; time was generally felt to be under the control of man, not the reverse; the belief that the dead
are able to influence the living enhanced reverence for the elderly; a
belief in collectivism was far stronger than a belief in individualism. Colonialism, the Cold War, and three decades following independence upset the traditional African worldview and created bewildering frictions within the political,
economic, and social wellbeing of the continent. The role of African leaders
who have been exiled or have lived in the West is examined. Nelson Mandela
and Thabo Mbeki are regarded as contemporary African leaders who traverse
the divide between the traditional Africa and the individualistic, materialistic,
scientific West. For future African leaders, the test will be whether they are
able to recognize and sustain the contradictions between the traditional and the
modern. Finally, the author speculates that Africa’s traditional worldview may
enable it to make a valuable contribution to the world in the field of human
relationship, giving the world a more human face.

W

hy did Charles Taylor, who has the blood of thousands on his hands, get a
send-off that was fit for a holy man? Why do the Africans not condemn
Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe in the strongest possible terms, invade the country, and
affect a regime change, as was done in Iraq? These, and similar questions, are the
daily bread of Africans who interact with non-Africans, particularly Americans, and
these are legitimate questions. Why was Charles Taylor, president of Liberia until
August 11, 2003, the man accused of causing constant instability and
unspeakable suffering in his country and in the region for decades, allowed to
resign? Furthermore, why, at the time of writing, has President Obasanju of Nigeria
still ruled out his extradition to Sierra Leone to stand trial for war crimes?1 Why
did nobody mention anything about this ignominious record when his African counterparts took leave of him in a resignation ceremony2 that was almost sacramental in
character? The BBC reported that, “in a speech replete with religious and African
imagery, he [President Taylor] described himself as a sacrificial lamb.”3 What motivated three other African presidents4 to travel from all corners of the continent to
preside over the ceremony as if they were his best friends? How could he be given
the choice of asylum and exile in luxury5 instead of meeting a fate similar to that
meted out to Nicolai Ceaucescu?6
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Another situation begs similar questions. Why, until the time of writing this paper, have the leaders of Africa in one meeting after another and successive speeches,
refused to reprimand their Zimbabwean counterpart publicly for the destruction of
lives, livelihoods, and the economic well-being of his country? The heads of state of
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in particular, have been
accused of taking, what Brian Kagoro, Coordinator for the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, calls a “hear no evil and see no evil”7 approach. Since President Mugabe
accelerated his land reform policy, the calls for immediate and concerted action have
become louder. The Commonwealth has suspended Zimbabwe indefinitely, Europe
has come under scrutiny for allowing President Mugabe onto its soil to attend EU
meetings, and differences between African and non-African leaders in how to tackle
the issue have been played out with varying degrees of acrimony. Yet, with the exception of one or two, the African leaders appear to be bent on maintaining the nonconfrontational course they have chosen. As recently as August 26, 2003, the SADC
heads of state only “noted that the region continued to work with Zimbabwe to address its political and economic situation [and] reaffirmed the indivisibility of
SADC and solidarity with Zimbabwe and that it will continue to work with the
country in order to encourage and sustain the positive developments that are taking
place in the search for lasting solutions.” The Summit also called for the lifting of
sanctions and engagement “in a constructive dialogue with Zimbabwe.”8 In the
meantime, land owned by white farmers has been confiscated without compensation
and with increasing violence, resulting in economic meltdown, unemployment, and
human suffering.
Why the persistence in the collective, “soft” approach? Are there perhaps more
than the very real geopolitical considerations to the pursuance by South Africa’s
President Thabo Mbeki of a “quiet diplomacy” approach since the crisis started some
four years ago? He has consistently refused to “issue instructions,” to “determine
their destiny for them,” to “pose as high priests at the inquisition, hungry for the
blood of the accused,” and to accept the position of “[r]ighteous and self-serving
indignation, and the attitude of superior rectitude.”9
This paper is the result of reflections that started in a paper10 I presented in 2000
at the last of three seminars that sought to learn lessons for dealing with conflicts in
regions such as Africa and Asia. At issue was the NATO intervention in Kosovo in
March 1999. I attempted to provide an insight into post-colonial, post-independence
and post–Cold War Africa by looking into the role played by regional and sub-regional organizations to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts. It soon became clear
that the role of leaders within the context of African culture and psychology needed
further analysis. Another paper followed in which more emphasis was put on the
psychology of diplomacy in Africa.11 A cursory exploration was done of African
culture as backdrop to current methodologies of conflict prevention and resolution,
both by organizations and a small sample of individual leaders. The article also
contained the beginnings of a contemplation about the value, or liabilities, of including traditional methods in handling conflict situations in Africa.
It was Nelson Mandela himself who acknowledged that the structure and organization of early African societies (in South Africa) fascinated him and greatly influenced the evolution of his political outlook.12 This paper is an attempt to explore
this in some detail because I would suggest that there are sufficient indications that
African leaders are increasingly sourcing their cultures and worldview to bring stability to their countries.
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At issue here are questions like the following: What informs current leadership
decisions and attitudes in Africa at a time when globalization seems to have infiltrated every aspect of ordinary life as well as the dynamics within and between
states? Is the notion of a clash of civilizations applicable to Africa’s dealings with
the world and with the world’s dealings with Africa? Where should the investigation
start? Should contemporary Africa be placed within the context of colonialism and
what followed, or should everything that came with and after colonialism rather be
put within the context of what Steve Biko13 termed “pure African culture,” that is,
the Africa that existed prior to colonialism? What did constitute “pure” Africa? Was
Biko correct when he postulated: “in essence even today one can easily find the
fundamental aspects of pure African culture in the present-day African”?14 Could
those remnants of culture and worldview that continue to manifest themselves in the
way Africans think and behave hold the key to a more stable and prosperous continent? What underlies the African Renaissance?15 Can Africa and its leadership be
restored along the lines of practices and beliefs that appear to have survived many
disruptions? In fact, is pre-colonial traditional culture not being reconstructed
already? What are the prospects for success?
The “political interaction” method of analysis provides the most comprehensive
and integrated, albeit complicated, approach to studying Africa’s political life
because it recognizes the importance of “official institutions,” but casts the analytical
net wider to examine the roles played by “individuals, social groups, traditional
authority structures, trading networks, and multinational corporations” in political
processes. And while “political factors account for many social and economic realities, [they are] themselves informed by historical, demographic, cultural, ecological,
ideological, and international factors” that these analysts term a “set of transactions”
by means of which “ongoing processes and future opportunities and constraints” can
be uncovered and elucidated.16 The implication should not be drawn that I am minimizing the importance of other factors, including those of more recent developments
such as the war in Iraq, the American “war” on terrorism, and the outcome of the
meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Cancun at the end of September 2003. Although I appreciate the entire scope of factors that impacts on leadership, for the purpose of this paper, the aspects of culture and worldview will receive
most attention.
The cultural and philosophical composition of Africa is not monolithic, and generalizations about this continent are as unfair and unscientific as those made with
respect to Islam, as Edward Said17 argued so passionately and correctly. But the
research for this paper has led me to contend that, despite obvious differences and
even subtler peculiarities, Steve Biko’s pronouncements remain legitimate in that
there are certain characteristics of sub-Saharan African culture and worldview that
are detectable in the approach by many of the continent’s leaders to the dilemmas
they face (or create).
Greater familiarity with the South African situation, as well as the undisputed if
sometimes begrudged role it has assumed with respect to conflict resolution on the
continent, has precipitated a preponderance of examples from this country to illustrate my hypothesis. An intriguing aspect of African leadership that will also receive
attention and begs further enquiry is the impact that exile has had on the culture and
worldview of the contemporary South African leadership.
If this paper contributes in some small way to a greater understanding of and
perhaps appreciation for Africa’s leaders and the many challenges they face, it will
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have been worth the effort. And lest I be accused of being “Eurocentric”18 and of
judging in terms of standards that are non-African standards, I have taken pains to
draw mainly from African sources to explain the central features of African
worldview and culture.
The Context: African Worldview and
Culture
In his highly informative book Conflict Resolution Wisdom from Africa,19 Jannie
Malan advises that “[o]ne of the major lessons the rest of the world may learn from
Africa is precisely that social reality should be taken seriously.”20 So, in order to
appreciate the realities that impact on African leadership, it is necessary to provide a
general outline of traditional African philosophy or worldview and discuss how
these views find expression in culture and the structures of society. It is also necessary to look at the responsibilities of individuals within these societies and see if and
how they influence styles of leadership.
In its most elementary form, I would describe “worldview” as the answer(s) or
response(s) that is/are given to the questions we ask about the universe, life, and all
its contents. And the New Penguin English Dictionary defines “culture” as “the socially transmitted pattern of human behavior that includes thought, speech, action,
institutions, and artefacts.” This definition suffices for the purpose of this exploration. Whether worldview comes before culture or culture before worldview has been
a matter of constant enquiry. One’s first instinct is that culture is the totality of responses we offer to the answers we develop about the questions we ask. In the African context, at least, the view is that worldview and culture shape each other in
equal measure. Furthermore, in African discourse, a distinction is not always made
between worldview, culture, and religion. John S. Mbiti, one of Africa’s most
prominent philosophers and a former professor of religious studies at Makerere
University in Kampala, Uganda, writes: “Religion is closely bound up with the traditional way of African life, while at the same time, this way of life has shaped
religion as well.”21
Anybody who has spent some time in Africa will agree with Mbiti that the people
of this continent are “deeply religious,”22 irrespective of whether they adhere to
traditional African beliefs, to Christianity, to Islam, or to the vast array of syncretistic faith systems that have developed over the centuries.
A Religious Universe
Mbiti explains the worldview of almost all Africans23 as one of a universe that was
created by an eternal being called God (or the Creator, or various other names24 ).
Because God created it, the universe automatically has to be looked at in a religious
way25 and treated as such. God is approachable through prayers, sacrifices, rituals,
and intermediaries. Africans believe that the various parts of the universe are inseparably linked, populated, and composed of their own visible and invisible kinds of
life in addition to such visible phenomena as the heavenly bodies, storms, eclipses of
the sun, and the like, and that all populations have their own responsibilities. Former
South African President Nelson Mandela talks about the traditional religion of his
own tribe, the Xhosa, as “characterized by a cosmic wholeness, so that there is little
distinction between the sacred and the secular, between the natural and the supernatural.”26
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No End to the Present
Because the universe is seen as eternal, “African ideas of time concern mainly the
present and the past, and have little to say about the future, which in any case is
expected to go on without end.” In fact, as Erich Leistner writes:“perceptions of
time are a central aspect of traditional African worldviews and have a significant
impact on development efforts.”27 He quotes John Mbiti, whose study of two Kenyan
Bantu languages showed that “people have little or no active interest in events that
lie in the future beyond, at most two years from now; and the languages concerned
lack words by which such events can be conceived or expressed.”28 According to
Leistner, African scholars “are broadly agreed that, unlike present-day Western cultures, traditional African cultures — and more specifically those of Bantu-speaking
peoples — do not perceive of time in an abstract, mathematical sense.” Furthermore,
the absence in traditional African mythology about final things, such as there is in
Christianity or Judaism, leads Leistner to conclude that Africans believe “the present
world will last forever,” that there is no sense in African thinking about eschatology,
a “world to come . . . or Doomsday.” Rather, traditional African orientation toward
the past, history, time, and progress is linked up with tradition, which, according to
Dominique Zahan, is “the sum total of the wisdom held by a society at a given
moment of its existence . . . a means of communication between the dead and the
living, as it represents the ‘word’ of the ancestors.”29 In other words, traditional
African worldview sees time as the perpetual, unquestioned present with greater
emphasis on the past than the future, which in any case does not stretch too far into
what is essentially an unfathomable reality “that is neither after nor before”30 and
within which the ideal state of affairs is the “indefinite repetition of the past”31 and
in which the concept of progress is also “intimately linked to the past.”32 Within the
context of this worldview, progress is “primarily the realization by a given generation of stages which others have reached before it.”33
Steve Biko brings another dimension to the African understanding of time in his
comments on their approach to problem solving: “Whereas the Westerner is geared
to use a problem-solving approach following very trenchant analyses, our approach
is that of situation-experiencing.” He quotes then president of Zambia, Kenneth
Kaunda, who asserted that “Africans being pre-scientific people . . . any action they
may take could be described more as a response of the total personality to the situation than the result of some mental exercise.”34 The preference for a more holistic,
and less Cartesian way of thinking is not restricted to Africans who are no longer on
the scene. It is to be found in almost every statement that comes out of African governments and permeates the writings of contemporary intellectuals. As recently as
1999, the respected South African intellectual and Christian theologian, Professor
Barney Pityana, wrote that there is a growing prevalence and self-conscious practice
of African customs and traditions and that the cohesiveness of their societies is still
derived from these beliefs and traditions.35 Pityana’s selection of Steve Biko’s critique of Christianity and the inherently religious nature of African practices shows
that we should take prevailing African ideas seriously when we reflect on African
issues.36
A Mysterious Universal Order
Another feature of the African worldview is that the universe is orderly and operates
at the levels of natural laws, morality, religion, and, crucially, that the universe has
an order that is “hidden and mysterious.” It has a power to which spirits and certain
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human beings have access, primarily through magic and other intermediaries, some
of whom are human and others spiritual beings. Ordinary people know little about
this mystical power of the universe, and the knowledge is often “safeguarded and
kept secret.” As is true of the concept of time, the role of ancestors is uppermost in
negotiating life, which is seen as one integrated whole, visible and invisible.
The Ancestors
Who are the ancestors and why do they play such a seminal role in African society?
Simply put, the African sees the ancestors as the souls of the departed. As these souls
are not immortal, they have to be kept alive by sacrifices and rituals, otherwise they
will go into a state of non-existence37 or become “ghosts.”38 The ancestors must be
kept alive because humans need their advice, support, and intercession with the gods
to manage the problems of life.39 “They are responsible for guarding the traditions
that they once experienced and maintained. Therefore, if someone commits an offense that goes unnoticed among the living, the ancestors intervene, striking the
sinner — or perhaps a relative, since they are all ‘one body,’ so that retribution
could fall on them all — with sickness, a disaster, or a bad harvest.”40 They are
regarded as still being part of the family, until about four or five generations after
their departure from “visible” life. Mbiti stresses that they are the spirits who matter
most in African culture. Mutwa contends that to keep the souls of his ancestors alive
is the greatest and most important duty a man has in life . . . a man who tries to live
without his ancestors is like a tree struggling without roots.41 When seen within this
context, it is easy to understand the importance of funerals in African culture and
why, by extension, they have political significance. Vast amounts of money, food,
and effort go into a funeral in order to ensure continued “contact with the dead”42
and to serve as a public display of a proper honoring of the ancestors. Nowadays, of
course, elaborate funerals have become status symbols and are to be seen even in the
squatter camps. I do not know of a single person who returned from decades of exile
or long periods of political imprisonment, and had become largely secularized in
other areas of life, whose first visit back in South Africa was not to the graves of
his/her ancestors. And they all bemoaned their sadness at being unable, during their
years in exile, to fulfill their obligations to their ancestors at the proper places
because the belief is that the souls of the departed hover in the place where they
died.
The connection between ancestors and land is of crucial importance almost everywhere in Africa because it is regarded as an insult to the ancestors to leave the land
where they lived and died. One has to be able to “fetch his/her departed ones when
s/he moves, so that when they wish to visit, they would know where to find their
living family members.”43 Not only will leaving the land induce the ancestors’
wrath; it will cut the living off from contact with the dead. Given this attitude, think
how devastating colonial land policies have been to the fiber of African society, why
land ownership remains such a politicized issue, and why it has been such an “easy”
rallying cry for President Mugabe in the past few years.
A Universe of Relationship
The role of humankind in a religious universe, which is populated by the souls of
the living, departed, visible and invisible creation, is of paramount importance. Uppermost in the African mind is relationship — in all aspects of life. The individual is
seen to be the “link between earth and heaven,” “the centre of the universe,” “the
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priest which links the universe with God the creator,” who “awakens the universe,
speaks to it, listens to it, [who] tries to create a harmony with the universe. It is as if
the whole world exists for man’s sake.”44
But it is not the individual that is important. In all of African society, the group is
seen to be the custodian of life, of cultural well-being and survival. The role of the
individual is not to serve himself, but always to strengthen the community. There is
almost no sense of individual reward for excellence, except for the veneration of the
chief as embodiment or symbol of the collective. “The oneness of community . . . is
at the heart of our culture,” wrote Steve Biko.45 Starting with the family, society is
composed of a myriad of interlinked communities, patterns, and rituals that are
designed to sustain life, the operative concept of which is “ubuntu.”
Ubuntu
Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace Prize winner and former Archbishop of Cape Town,
translates ubuntu as “a central feature of the African Weltanschauung [worldview]
. . . . It is to say, ‘My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.’ We
belong in a bundle of life. . . . It is not ‘I think therefore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am
human because I belong. I participate, I share. . . . What dehumanizes you inexorably dehumanizes me.’”46 In practice, ubuntu means that family boundaries are not
limited to immediate blood relatives and that the notion of solitude and individual
functioning as it is appreciated in Western culture is less important than functioning
in and as a group. Nelson Mandela recounts that he could “hardly recall any occasion as a child when I was alone. In African culture, the sons and daughters of one’s
aunts or uncles are considered brothers and sisters, not cousins. . . . We have no
half-brothers or half-sisters. My mother’s sister is my mother; my uncle’s son is my
brother; my brother’s child is my son, my daughter. . . . Anyone who claims descent
from a common ancestor is deemed part of the same family.”47 Obviously, this
notion of community manifests itself in the ordering of what the Nigerian thinker
Claude Ake called the “organic character of society”: “[Africans’] sense of freedom
is not framed by tensions between the individual and the collectivity or the prospects
of securing immunities against the collectivity. Nor is it defined in terms of autonomy or opposition but rather in terms of co-operation and in the embeddedness
of the individual in an organic whole.”48 Every individual knows, as Mandela puts
it, “his or her place” in the greater collective and takes his responsibility toward the
group seriously. As Biko pointed out, there were never songs for individuals, but all
African songs are group songs. The nonindividualistic nature of African society is
seen in its attitude toward property where everything was jointly owned, jointly
cultivated, and jointly protected. Biko also wrote that Africans are prepared “to have
a much slower progress in an effort to make sure that all of us are marching to the
same tune.”49
Of course, the value that Africans put in togetherness, in ubuntu, would have
grave implications when capitalism and its alter ego, competition, were introduced
to Africa.
Leaders — Custodians of the Past
The position of traditional leaders deserves special attention because it has often
been asserted that African leaders after independence, while adhering to the colonial
structures in name, have actually structured their governments according to their
own traditional customs.50 Jeffrey Brian Peires explains that, in many traditional
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African societies, the head of the homestead was the eldest male. “He enjoyed a
position of considerable power, including authority in the spheres of religion,
economy, and social relations. His authority was derived from his genealogical seniority, and the status of the other males in the homestead likewise depended on
their genealogical rank. Women, like children, had rights and obligations, but were
regarded as perpetual minors and were excluded from a formal voice in homestead
affairs.”51 Chieftainship was a “system of hereditary devolution of power in which
the right to rule was believed to be transmitted through the blood. It divided African
society into two classes: chiefs of the blood destined to govern, and commoners,
men of ordinary birth, who could not aspire to formal authority whatever their personal qualities.”52
Many African societies put primary importance on the collective strengths of the
older generation and religious leaders because they are deemed to be imbued with
divine authority, power, and wisdom. Those who possess religious knowledge range
from the “trained [medicine men, diviners, ritual elders, priests] to those who only
take the lead when the need arises [such as] rulers and national leaders.”53
A Leader Must be Tough
The downside of chieftaincy, which is not unique to Africa, was that control of the
judicial apparatus enabled the chiefs to confiscate property (in many societies the
cattle) of rich commoners through the manipulation of witchcraft accusations and
inheritance laws. Commoners did not revolt against such “tyranny” because people
believed that a powerful authority figure was required to adjudicate their lawsuits,
invoke the spirits of their ancestors, protect them from their enemies, and shoulder
the heavy responsibility of providing food in time of famine. They did not “expect
such men to be friendly, soft-hearted fellows; on the contrary, they liked men with
the cunning, magic, and majesty to overcome their foes and bend the universe to
their will.” In return, the chiefs were “careful . . . to cultivate the dual image of
being mighty and terrible, and yet at the same time the fathers of their people and
the defenders of their hearths and herds.” And because the rewards of leadership
were considerable, the pressures of rivalry were also significant and in succession
wars “brother chief fought brother chief, while mothers and uncles intrigued on
behalf of their candidates.”54 Peires assures us, however, that most conflicts were
bloodless and were amicably resolved by the loser seeking his fortune in a new
place. A wise chief knew that he depended on a contented following who executed
his orders voluntarily, and he interacted with them on a frequent basis through consultative meetings or “general assemblies.”
Communalism
Mandela’s description of the traditional leadership in which he grew up is as representative of the phenomenon as it is revealing and relevant to this paper. Chieftaincy
was “the very centre around which life revolved [and] pervaded every aspect of our
lives . . . and was the pre-eminent means through which one could achieve influence
status.”55 Meetings were called when the need arose and all members of the clan
were allowed to attend. The regent was surrounded by a group of counselors of high
rank who functioned as his parliament and judiciary. These counselors retained the
knowledge of tribal history and custom in their heads. From the point where he had
welcomed the gathering, the regent would remain silent until the meeting was nearing its end. Everyone who wanted to speak did so, without interruption, and with
candor. All meetings ended “in unanimity or not at all.” Only at the end would the
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regent speak, basically summing up what had been said and trying to form some
consensus. If a conclusion were not reached, another meeting would be convened. At
the end of the meeting, a praise-singer would “deliver a panegyric to the ancient
kings” together with compliments and satire on the present chiefs.
Mandela’s rendition of traditional leadership is a succinct distillation of how
many Africans would characterize their worldview and culture and of how I have
observed it since childhood. There is a fundamental reverence for tradition within a
society that is based on communalism and that comprises both the living and the
dead. Problem-solving in all aspects of life is done in a holistic, collective manner
where the entire community is involved and a high premium is placed on leadership
from above. These leaders are usually the most respected members of the community — the elders in all their personifications. “Consequently, it is also unusual to
wash dirty linen in public and confront people causing, or involved in, a conflict [or
other] situation directly, especially in front of outsiders.”56 This is because the dignity of the person and his or her role in society is paramount. The inherent dignity
of all persons, even if he is an adversary, is the undercurrent in Mandela’s autobiography, as well as in the writings of Steve Biko, Desmond Tutu, Mahmoud Mamdani,
Ngugi wa Thiong’o, and many other African commentators on African culture and
history. It is this one quality that, in traditional African culture, should direct every
interaction with a fellow human being. To illustrate: it is rare to hear one African
leader attack the character or actions of another in public. If they do, it is usually
done in veiled terms and often hardly detectible to observers who are not familiar
with African values. It is more often a threat to their dignity than a particular action,
that leads to resentment by Africans of people from other cultures, especially from
the West.
In summary, although there is no such thing as a pristine worldview or culture
that is uncontaminated by outside influences, many of the values, worldviews, and
cultures that have informed Africa in the past remain in use and are receiving renewed recognition. In this section, I have tried to highlight what I regard as the
most significant of these values. Any serious analysis of the dynamics within Africa
and of its leaders will include Jannie Malen’s observations about the intricacies of
African culture. Although he focuses on lessons from Africa to resolve conflicts, his
is a useful point of departure. He compares the complexity of African culture with
the intricate designs of a piece of cloth, the basic structure of which is formed by
“two interwoven sets of threads, still called by their traditional names of warp and
weft. . . . Throughout all the complexity and variety in Africa’s history of conflict
resolution, there seems to be an elemental warp and weft: The one is the tradition of
family or neighbourhood negotiation facilitated by elders. And the other is the attitude of togetherness in the spirit of humanhood [ubuntu].”57 Like Mandela, he emphasizes the far-reaching implications of togetherness by describing the importance
of “reaching out to the group or the individual farthest from the leader concerned.”
The rationale behind it is that “the interests of the culturally or ethnically distant,
even of strangers, should be considered.”58
Colonialism and the Rest:
Impact on African Culture
The phenomena of war and conflict, the need for war tools, the rule of the strong
over the weak, and bad leadership and management prevailed in Africa, as elsewhere, since time immemorial. Traditional Africa was not perfect and those who
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would want to believe that it was live in as much denial as those who limit the effects of colonialism to absurd borders and the horrors of slavery, true though they
are. This largely uncritical analysis,59 or what Frantz Fanon called the “unconditional affirmation of African culture,”60 applies in particular to those who have been
singing the praises of African history and culture since Mandela’s speech61 at the
Organization of African Unity summit meeting in Tunisia in 1994 when he raised
the need for an African Renaissance. Therefore, before commenting on colonial and
post-colonial Africa, a few examples of the “imperfect” Africa before it was
“corrupted” by the West and others are necessary.
Basil Davidson cites the development of iron tools, and eventually iron weapons,
as an important stage in Africa’s development because it brought, “from about 600
B.C. onwards, a new source of military power.62 Those who first learned to use it
were able to rule their neighbors. . . . Stronger peoples began to rule weaker
peoples.”63 Thus, if “pre-scientific”64 Africa were as idyllic as the first part of this
paper may suggest, the traditional leaders would not have become complicit in
slavery65 and other forms of exploitation that became prevalent during the colonial,
Cold War, and post-independence period. Maier goes further: “If the precolonial
order was so healthy, it should have stood up more effectively against foreign interference.”66 Roland Oliver provides many examples of precolonial imperfection,
especially with respect to slavery.67 Long before Western powers arrived in Africa,
the practice of slavery was well established among African communities. Furthermore, unlike in the Roman Empire where slaves had been freed under certain
conditions, Africa, mostly south of the Sahara, did not make provision for
manumission. In his seminal book, The African Experience, Oliver gives a fascinating account of the build-up of slavery and the “capacity for violence existing in the
relations of large numbers of small societies” in Africa from pre-dynastic Egypt
onwards. And he shows how local traditional leaders made use of the power that
came from using newcomers as allies against their own rivals. This is vintage
politics — also in Africa.
If the large kingdoms that existed prior to colonialism were as closely knit as
their philosophers claim, the divisive effects of colonialism might have been
reduced. Again, Oliver is insightful: “It becomes ever plainer that the largest states
of pre-colonial Africa tended to have the fragility of card-houses: one unexpected
challenge, and they would disintegrate into their component particles.” He gives
more credence to “miniscule” states of ten to fifteen thousand people who seemed
often to have had greater cohesion and durability, arguing that the first generation of
professional historians of Africa tended to look at the few big states of the continent
through “rose-colored”68 spectacles, implying that they overemphasized their
stability and cohesiveness.
Greed and self-aggrandizement were not restricted to Westerners only. The impi
(warriers) of the Zulus of South Africa under Shaka (to cite but one example) commanded considerable fear and respect from rival nations, including the colonizing
British and Afrikaners. Furthermore, the clientage system in some southern African
communities give ample evidence of a pre-colonial African society that was as “normal” as any other in that it was based on social hierarchy, division, and domination.
Clientage involved varying degrees of “labor exploitation, ranging from a voluntary
and temporary status to a form of permanent servitude little short of slavery, some
of which was hereditary.”69 There is no sign of communal property rights and
ubuntu in any of these systems.
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What, then, distinguishes leadership, systems of government, and the trade
networks of Africa before the 1870s from those traders and systems that came later?
I propose that the most important factor is the West’s ingenuity with and propensity
for violence and its instruments. (Maier reminds us that future historians, if they are
truthful, will “rate the violence of twentieth-century Africa as relatively mild indeed
compared to the slaughter that Europe has experienced and imposed on others.”)70 In
addition, whereas in the past, most expeditions that traded in Africa were under
African leadership, they now went deeper into the continent, were under nonAfrican leadership, and used force with weapons against which Africans had no
defense.71 There is no doubt that, as has been shown in recent history all over the
world, the very presence of sophisticated arms is a primary cause of violence and
division that may have otherwise been limited.72 Oliver seems to agree at least in
part when he poses that in eastern Africa colonialism introduced a process of
political destabilization, “partly as a result of the general diffusion of trade muskets,
and partly through the penetration of the interior by coastmen armed with superior
weapons.”73
Thus, when one compares post-colonial realities with those that prevail(ed) in
traditional Africa, it is easy to understand why there is such a fundamental
resentment against colonialism and all the other manifestations of outside interference in Africa over the centuries, and why a civilizational tension, and not an
outright civilizational clash, persists.
Africans are frequently accused of being unreliable if not outright dishonest and
stupid.74 Although they might be the first to acknowledge that their traditional culture and worldview are rooted in a pre-scientific (that is, a pre-Cartesian) background, history shows that those Europeans who “scrambled”75 for the continent
were, and still are, as dishonest and unscientific as they accuse the Africans of being.
As a result of the Conference of Berlin of 1884-85, “most Africans lost their independence without signing any treaties at all.” The division of Africa took place “on
the basis of maps that provided detailed information about the coastal regions, but
very little about the interior, and on the assumption that all powers were seeking a
reasonable allocation of African territory, which would reflect their general standing
in world affairs as much as their already established interests on the ground.” Most
of the subsequent agreements were between European powers about African territories without Africans having any say in or control over it.
With respect to the partition of Africa, Oliver is of the view that, although it was
not instant but rather “cumulative,” it amounted to a “ruthless act of political amalgamation” whereby about ten thousand units were reduced to about forty. But the
amalgamation brought more units of peoples together than it divided and, in the
course of time, “greatly strengthened the sense of unity existing within the clusters,
[which] had very little immediate effect on the peoples whose nationality was ultimately to be determined by it.” I propose that he misses the point. History is replete
with tragedies that resulted from both dividing and forcing people together, regardless of the size of the territory in which this happened, and Africa is no exception.
Yugoslavia and Israel/Palestine are but two recent non-African examples.
Apart from the imposition of artificial and unworkable borders in which the Africans had no input, perhaps the most far-reaching impact of colonialism (and, for the
most part, Christianity) on Africa must surely have been in the realm of consciousness, time, and identity. Those that penetrated Africa established “alternative systems
of authority”76 alongside the traditional ones. Two interpretations — African and
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European — of the concepts of consciousness, time, and identity were therefore
forced to function alongside and with each other. The notion of an end to time (and
its scarcity), and of a finite universe (and the anticipation of a Judgment Day) as the
West (used to) understand them, are diametrically opposed to the traditional African
approach. So is the concept of the individual’s responsibility for his/her own fate as
distinct from that of the group. Western conceptions of time are also contrary to
Africa’s traditional management systems, which were centered around the community instead of the individual, were dependent on the guidance of leaders/ancestors/
elders, and functioned within a consultative approach by the community.
By way of illustration, and as I have argued elsewhere,77 colonialism had a
“deconstructive” effect on African culture and identity. It also deconstructed other
African concepts. What Bernard Lewis78 wrote about identity in the Middle East as
compared to Europe is equally relevant to Africa: with a few exceptions, the names
of European states are derived from their ethnic group, from the language they
speak and from their cultural and territorial identities that have existed for centuries.
But in Africa, despite identities, cultures, languages, and territorial designations that
had developed over millennia, a line was drawn across all of it with the stroke of a
pen at the Conference of Berlin and a division and renaming of people and places
ensued, which Karl Maier has termed “international piracy.”79 Alien cultures and
religious systems were introduced with the utmost cruelty (slavery and misguided
missionaries), which ultimately made themselves felt in the very core of African
consciousness, as articulated through language and manifested through alien educational systems. Mahmoud Mamdani makes similar points, more forcefully.80
Not only was there a replacement and displacement of people, all African
languages were affected. Those that have not been almost totally obliterated became
subservient to the languages of the colonizers, so much so that in the Organization
of African Unity, and since 2002 the African Union, not a single sub-Saharan
language is recognized as the official language of the organization. (The official
languages of the AU are English, French, Portuguese, and Arabic.) As the very
vehicle by means of which any human being gives expression to his/her consciousness, the effect on African consciousness and learning was devastating. Ngugi wa
Thiong’o, for whom language is the “location of memory itself,”81 notes that “the
imperialist West . . . planted their memory on our intellect through language.
Writers, artists, musicians, intellectuals, and workers in ideas are the keepers of
memory of a community.” What fate, he asks, awaits a community when its keepers
of memory have been subjected to the West’s linguistic means of production and
storage of memory — English, French, and Portuguese? He accuses the keepers of
the African’s memory of not storing their knowledge, emotions, and intellect in
African languages. It is like having a granary but at harvest you store your produce
in someone else’s granary, he says. The result is that 90 percent of intellectual
production in Africa is stored in European languages. Like Ngugi, Pitika P. Ntuli
pleads for a decolonization of the African’s mind by means of a “detailed analysis of
culture as ideology.”82 Steve Biko puts it more simply by saying the forcing of foreign languages onto indigenous communities caused them to develop an inferiority
complex,83 which needed to be rectified. Coming from a country where the issue of
language has always been politicized, the timidity to use one’s own language is allpervasive, especially in the cities. Even now, in a country where the majority of the
population can speak or at least understand a minimum of four or five of the ten
indigenous languages, leaders still give their speeches mostly in English. President
Mbeki has received much criticism for not speaking his mother tongue, Xhosa, more
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often and for using a type of English and employing concepts that are far beyond
the comprehension of the ordinary citizen, even to the point of being accused of
failing to relate to his constituency and contributing to nation-building.
But there is another aspect to the issue of language. Local rulers adopted the
methods and tools of foreigners to gain more slaves and power for their own
benefit. What prevented them from exploiting the introduction of new modes of
communication to serve their indigenous languages? Very few post-colonial leaders
— politicians, church leaders, scientists, or business people — have made the
concerted effort to codify their own languages to ensure that they grew and retained
their relevance. Policies to reintroduce indigenous languages are a relatively recent
phenomenon.
If the forced imposition of foreign languages had such an adverse impact on the
sense of identity of Africans and is still being felt throughout the continent, also
among its leaders, surely, the imposition of foreign religions had an impact, too.
Leistner is correct when he says that, through the introduction of Christianity and, to
a lesser extent Islam, traditional Africa was introduced to a worldview that was no
longer focused “on the past,” but on a “new, linear conception of time, particularly
future time.” The new approach to time had indeed led members of indigenous
African churches not only to have “a more advanced work philosophy than members
of the historic churches, but also [to] a more modern attitude towards time.”84 But as
people become more self-confident in expressing their “Africanness,” there is still a
tendency by many to manage their professional lives along the more linear, Christian
notion of time and their private lives along the more cyclical concepts of time.
Ultimately, it has led to a paradoxical way of living for many Africans because
traditional African belief has it that there is no practical distinction between the
physical and metaphysical aspects of existence, while in Western culture, there is a
definite distinction between the two. Furthermore, this difference in worldview has
led to unimaginable suffering for Africans because policies that were deemed as
purely rational and “common sense” by colonizers (for instance with respect to land
use, health matters, and family arrangements), still have an intrinsic spiritual value
for Africans, as has been shown earlier. It is therefore no wonder that Africans have
chosen to adopt Christianity and Islam on their own terms. With respect to Christianity, the behavior of the colonial powers is instructive. At the time of the colonial
conquests, the British, Portuguese, and French preached a faith which is supposed to
speak of grace, mercy, and concern for the neighbor. These are also values that are
intrinsic to traditional African belief systems. But the unspeakable savagery and
individual enrichment of the colonizers belied their confessions of faith. It was as if
they themselves did not believe in any god to whom they were accountable and as if
there were no Day of Judgment, as if there were no end to time — which one could
argue was an almost “African” conception of time and morality, but was particularly
brutal in its practical implication. One visit to any of the slave castles that litter the
west coast of Africa will prove the point. At Gorée Island (off mainland Senegal),
the dungeon where captured Africans were held prior to their dispatch to all parts of
the world is right next to the chapel where the Portuguese governor worshipped! It
is no surprise then that those Africans who adopted Christianity refused to be
molded into the West’s image of that faith, but rather syncretized Christianity into
their own traditions in order to domesticate it according to their understanding of
the universe and man’s role in it.
Colonialism, the rivalries that pertained during the Cold War, and the “first
fruits” of independence also impacted on the structuring of society, as well as on
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administrative and legal systems. With respect to the structuring of society, impersonal bureaucratic administrative and legal systems were imposed that completely
disregarded and denied the validity of personalized indigenous systems and structures that had served Africans well for thousands of years. Local arrangements such
as chieftaincies were relegated to barely tolerated or manipulated appendices of
foreign processes. More cynically still, power and government constructs were established that, on the one hand, reduced well-functioning arrangements to paralysis
but, on the other hand, instilled notions of personal advancement that may not have
been completely absent, but became destructively prevalent. An even more fundamental disruption was the superimposition of individualism and its offshoot, unadulterated capitalism, on societal and economic systems that were (and still are) inherently communal in nature. All areas of life were permeated by Western philosophies,
ideologies, and the cultures that had their origins and that were contrary to everything that Africans had developed over the centuries and by which African societies
prevailed. In the end, Africa and its people were saddled with the fatal combination
of a monumental identity crisis and a new type of egoism that led them to allow the
continent to become the philosophical, economic, educational, and developmental
laboratory (if not playground or even dumping ground) of the Euroamerican world.
Sadly, all these foreign notions were rooted in notions of individualism, capitalism,
and consumerism. I suggest that there is not a single government, economic, health,
or developmental system that has not been “tried out” in Africa. As Steve Biko
pointed out, with “new styles of clothing, new customs, new forms of etiquette, new
medical approaches, and perhaps new armaments, it has always been the pattern
throughout history that whosoever brings the new order knows it best and is therefore the perpetual teacher of those to whom the new order is being brought.”85
Much has been written about the macro-effects of colonialism. What is less common in public discourse, and is the purpose of this exploration, are what effects it
colonialism had on Africa’s political and social order and economic well-being at the
level of the individual because it continues to have a direct bearing on leadership
style. Christianity brought with it the idea that each individual is personally responsible for survival, place in society, and destiny. With the West came such conflicting
concepts as individual ambition instead of conforming to the group, the promotion
of individual self-interest instead of the preservation of the interests of the community, and the individualization of income, lifestyle, and decision-making as opposed
to sharing of everything.
With the advent of independence, leaders were supposed to lead so-called nationstates that were not “nations” in the sense of a shared language and heritage nor
states with long-accepted and evolved identities. These leaders, while having much
experience in fighting colonialism but no exposure to managing a modern state, had
to take over responsibilities that used to shared by respected individuals in their
communities, within the collective framework of the homestead. As happened elsewhere in the world, many leaders equated the states over which they presided (to
which they felt no loyalty because their boundaries and state systems were decided
upon by outsiders) with their personal identities, much Louis XIV did by claiming
“L’etat, c’est moi.” In addition, models of government were introduced that contradicted age-old notions of unity and humanity. Crucially, the role of the elderly was
disturbed. Elderly people are now being left to fend for themselves, which used to
be completely unthinkable in traditional Africa. As “ancestors-in-waiting,” they had
been treated with utmost reverence and care by the extended family and never had to
make plans for old age. There was only one plan: “Africa devised a privatized social
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security system and positioned it where it could be most effective and most caring:
in the family and community.”86 As a consequence of “modernity,” traditional concepts of leadership were affected because older people no longer had their traditional
place in society. That is why, in the words of Chinua Achebe, much of Africa “fell
apart.”87
The disastrous outcome of colonial politics and postcolonial leaders are taken up
by Mahmoud Mamdani. In the conclusion to his Citizen and Subject, he ascribes the
excesses of colonialist and post-independence states to a deliberate shift in their
perspective toward the customary. Applying lessons from India and Indochina, the
colonial powers shifted from being “torchbearers of individual freedom to being
custodians protecting the customary integrity of dominated tribes, the central tenet
of which was ‘“an expanded notion of the customary.”’ Britain, was “the first to
marshal authoritarian possibilities in indigenous culture, . . . the first to realize that
the key to an alien power’s achieving a hegemonic domination was a cultural
project: one of harnessing the moral, historical, and community impetus behind
local custom to a larger colonial project.” The practical implication was that “custom
was defined and enforced by customary Native Authorities, backed up by the armed
might of the central state.” Post-independent leaders applied a variety of methods to
reform the states they had inherited from the colonial powers. Their “core agenda”
was threefold: “deracializing civil society, detribalizing the Native Authority, and
developing the economy in the context of unequal international relations.” Few of
their methods, which included “mainstream nationalism” and “radical nationalism,”
succeeded because they failed to link the “urban with the rural” in a democratic and
sustainable manner, of which the “rural is key.” Both methods led to various forms
of “decentralized despotism” and “centralized despotism,” sharing one axis: despotism.88 In most cases, Mamdani argues that, although the rural communities were
“in” civil society, they were not “of” civil society. This dilemma was a particular
one for the migrant workers of the past. “They shared a common social position:
they lay beyond the reach of customary law and yet had few entitlements to civil
rights.” I suspect that this alienation from their cultural roots and the impersonal
nature of urban existence is also a shared feature of a significant number of unemployed workers all over contemporary Africa who still flock to the cities for a better
life.
Another factor that seems to have received little attention when analyzing contemporary African leadership is the consequences of the interventions made by Africans into the politics of their countries after they had been in exile in various parts
of the world, but primarily the West. I would propose that there are mainly three
categories of returning African exiles. The first include the “recaptured” slaves that
were set free from slave-smuggling ships and taken by the British to Sierra Leone
from 1807 onward, and later by the Americans to Liberia. They will not concern us
here except to mention their rejection of the leadership of acknowledged African
chiefs (in this case the Gold Coast “settlements).89 Their argument was that that
subjection to these local chiefs would be tantamount to condoning “the unrepentant
savagery which . . . had delivered their parents to slaving ships and enslavement in
the Americas.”90 They further rejected the notion that their countries could be entrusted to “tradition” and insisted on the establishment of leadership positions above
the traditional leaders who had remained behind.
For the purposes of this article, some reflection on the second wave of returned
exiles is pertinent. They are those Africans and their supporters who, during the
colonial period, had gone abroad for study and/or political exile, returned, and
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became leaders with ideas, mostly gained from exposure to socialist doctrines
prevailing in Western and Eastern Europe. These ideas satisfied the intellectual and
political appetites of independence leaders. In the long run, however, it left their
countries destitute. These post-exile leaders spoke in modern terms, but their political legacies indicate otherwise and point to a more traditional approach to leadership. The gravitation toward tradition should not be surprising because the notion of
opposition as it evolved into multiparty politics in Europe and the United States
over centuries is completely different from traditional African social constructs.
Jannie Malan explains this tendency for a more traditional approach as “an allergy to
foreign and imperfect models of democracy and a desire to reinstate a traditional
African model oriented towards consensus and unity.” Had states developed along
the age-old preference for consensus and unity, the one-party state model of governance would have been “justified” because, as he sees it, “the founding fathers . . .
praised it as a return to the happier past, when the elders used to sit under a big tree,
and talk until they agree,” Malan concedes that these one-party states became
“authoritarian and conflict-generating centers.”91 George Ayittey is much more
scathing of these leaders. To cover up for “inadequacies,” the “Big Man” “is often
weak internally or psychologically. An economic illiterate, he cannot distinguish
between a budget deficit and a trade deficit. To cover up his inadequacies, he craves
— and demands — veneration, adulation, and obedience. He surrounds himself with
followers who constantly reaffirm their faith in his exceptional wisdom and generosity.”92 One needs to ask whether these tendencies developed out of the blue, or
whether, because of their insecurities in the face of modern government systems,
these leaders “went traditional” and found refuge in the cultural systems they had
known, but then took them to the extreme.93 Of course, Charles Taylor from Liberia
fits well the category Ayittey describes. Robert Mugabe is the last of the older generation of post-independence leaders. Until fairly recently, he managed his country
well, at least economically. But it has been interesting to note that, from a political
perspective, he has increasingly exploited traditional values, such as the importance
of land, to further his own agenda, thereby also destroying his country economically.
The third and probably last wave of political exiles that returned is more relevant
to South Africa and less so to the other African countries that gained their independence94 much earlier. These were the members of the African National Congress
(ANC) and other liberation movements who returned from about 1990 to 1994.
Many of them had been in exile for thirty years or more, while a larger, younger
group had left South Africa after the Soweto uprising of June 1976. There were two
categories. First there were the intellectuals who had been based in the capitals of
Europe (both Eastern and Western Europe) and later in the United States of
America. They were driving the anti-apartheid movement. Then there were the
soldiers of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, and members
of armed wings of other South African liberation movements, who had fought the
South African regime in the countries that were being destabilized by South Africa
at the time, and by means of guerilla warfare inside the country. Most of them had
left as young people and returned as adults. The soldiers came back and were mostly
integrated into the South African National Defense Force of the new South Africa.
They had their own problems. But what is more relevant for the purposes of this
paper is the role played by the intellectual exiles, many of whom subsequently became leaders. They have impressive qualifications from many prominent academic
institutions all over the world. They are well-traveled and street smart. Their
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knowledge and insight into world affairs are authoritative. In sum, they have had the
best political and academic exposure and contacts one could dream of, and they
interact with self-confidence with world leaders in many fields. Of the twenty-seven
members of the South African cabinet (including the President), thirteen have spent
considerable periods of their lives in exile. 95 Many have senior positions in public
and private companies and academic institutions. Alas, Allister Sparks, one of South
Africa’s most prominent commentators, has noted recently:
They were tough, smart, and dedicated, but none had the skills required to run a complex country with a sophisticated economy. Thanks to the restrictions imposed by apartheid on people of color, and the limited opportunities in exile, none had in fact run
anything at all except of the most rudimentary kind. Now they were confronted with this
enormous challenge, having to learn on the job while an expectant nation and a whole
world beyond kept a critical watch on their every move.96

The question arises whether those countries that had supported the exiles and antiapartheid organizations in South Africa and elsewhere should not also bear some
responsibility for the dearth of management and administrative skills among this
group of exiles. Few countries demanded strict accounting of and accountability for
the funds that were provided to the exiles. To my knowledge, only Denmark eventually demanded legal responsibility from individuals and organizations for funds they
had received.97 Perhaps this laissez faire attitude in the provision of funding and
other means by those countries that provided support to the exiles led to an attitude
of entitlement that was not fully relinquished after the exiles returned and had to
assume the responsibilities of real government. Policies, legislation, and statements
are well-argued but implementation is a constant challenge. As Sparks noted, the
development of management and administrative skills, which is so crucial for the
functioning of a modern state, was certainly not seen as a priority.
An equally pertinent question is how did, or do, these returned exiles really “fit”
into South Africa after so many years out of the country? Do they perhaps have the
same attitude towards “the locals” as their forbears in Sierra Leone had? Did they
have what Basil Davidson calls that same “acute experience of alienation” that the
recaptives had felt but is also a common feature of culture shock? Did their time
outside South Africa, and the moral and material support they had received from
their countries, make them look to these countries as “the shrine of salvation,” and to
the people who had not gone into exile as people who “knew and could know little
or nothing”?98 Or have they perhaps developed the opposite attitude: “We lived
outside and have had all the experience, the locals and the rest of the world can
teach us nothing”? Have they also formed a “sub-elite whose interests generally
coincided with, and were in fact protected by, the foreign rulers they were agitating
against”?99 Do they feel “in place,” a state of mind that escaped Edward Said,100 also
an exile of sorts for all his life; or are they perhaps, subconsciously, hankering back
to the days in exile where their responsibilities were mainly fighting apartheid,
studying and traveling from one conference to the next to state their (important)
case (perhaps even in relative luxury)? Have they retained the traditional sense of
ubuntu or have they, or at least some of them, succumbed to the trappings of individualism and power? Have they returned with the Western appreciation of time or
are they still more comfortable with the traditional attitude that they can make as
much time as they need? Has exile induced in them the capacity to take decisions
and assume responsibility for those decisions, or is the “collective” still so much part
of them that delegation, and with it individual decision-making, is not the preferred
option? In fact, did the imperative of a strong cohesiveness in exile induce an even
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stricter sense of collectivity and need to consult before anything is said or done?
What are there relations with each other and with other South Africans, both black
and white?
These questions are pertinent because the answers will provide an indication of
the type of leadership they may espouse. Mandela provides some guidance when he
alludes to the effect of exile on the returnees. He states that they were “unfamiliar”
with present-day South Africa. It was as “new-found” a land as it was for him after
his release from prison and the old habits and techniques of an underground movement functioning clandestinely were “deeply ingrained.”101 Sparks provides an
excellent illumination on life in exile.102 Whereas political prisoners were thrown
together in close proximity for years on end, the exiles lived a “peripatetic and often
precarious existence scattered around the globe.” It meant that, in order to live relatively comfortably in London or Stockholm, one would have to stay in the “good
books” of an individual leader. If you did not cultivate a good relationship with
someone in a decision-making position, you got a designation “somewhere in the
African bush.” And because the military wing, MK, played such a dominant role in
the ANC, and most ANC leaders were also expected to undergo military training, the
exile community took on more of a “commandist culture” than either the prisoners
or the activists back home.103 “More important still, the exiles were vulnerable to
infiltration by agents of the apartheid regime and over time the devastating success
of these spies engendered a paranoia within the exiled leadership that discouraged
openness and led to a more centralized command structure. Indeed, for the exiles,
paranoia was common sense.” Sparks contends that while the paranoia was understandable, it was also damaging because it resulted in “some leading figures forming
intelligence networks of their own, which fostered mutual suspicions and rivalries
and tended to produce a manipulative political culture. Although Oliver Tambo, the
ANC’s leader in exile, managed to keep the movement together, “the rivalries and
suspicions left their stamp on the exile culture.”104
To provide a comprehensive perspective, it is necessary to juxtapose the behavior
of the exiles against those who remained to fight apartheid inside South Africa. Of
the mainly two groups of South African-based activists, the first was the older generation who spent long periods in prison. They are mostly retired by now. While I
will deal with Mandela more specifically below, suffice it to say that he himself has
often stated that prison taught him to hate the system but not to hate the perpetrators
of the system themselves. Most of those ex-prisoners who got senior positions in the
1994 elections, gained respect from ordinary South Africans for their humility and
down-to-earth interaction with people. Sparks105 is again a keen observer. Prison
gave Mandela his “remarkable resilience but it humanized him, taught him patience
and gave him a much deeper insight into human nature. It also gave him time . . . to
better understand his adversary and how best to deal with him.” The second South
African-based group was the younger group of “internals” who continued the
struggle after the 1976 Soweto riots and “took the streets and confronted the apartheid regime’s security forces during the climactic years of the 1980s.” They formed
the United Democratic Front (UDF), a loose alliance of more than a thousand community organizations, with the trade unions providing the “organizational” spine.
Sparks recounts that, because of the looseness of their alliance, in which each affiliated body retained its own identity and autonomy, the activists formed an “elaborate
system of collective decision-making and developed a strong aversion to any cult of
personality or any individual having overriding authority.” As a reporter, he found
dealing with them a nightmare because you could never get a statement from
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anyone: there had always to be a meeting to produce a collective mandate. Nor was
it easy to interview individual leaders, since it was considered unacceptable for any
individual to presume to speak on behalf of the alliance. You would have to meet
with a representative group all of whom would have a say. According to Sparks, it
became more than a political culture but an “ideology” and was taken to “impractical extremes.” But in light of the traditional preference for consultation, and group
actions opposed to individual action, as related above, I would assert that these
“internals” were just implementing their traditional culture in a more modern, and
therefore obviously more elaborate but decidedly dedicated manner under conditions
of extreme pressure. But many South Africans regard this category of activists as the
more practical bunch of leaders, in contrast to the “exiles,” whose approach to leadership is often seen as remote, ideological, and bent on change for its own sake.
From my own experience of living abroad for extended periods, and from observations I was able to make over three years in the former Czechoslovakia after their
“Velvet Revolution” of 1989 when many Czech exiles also returned, I contend that
effect of exile on leadership is an important issue to examine.106 Many Czechs who
had encountered the returnees (and they were everywhere) told of their frustrations
with the exiles. They were seen to be domineering, out of touch with local conditions, dismissive of systems that had been developed and were working in their
absence, wanting to change everything (policies, structures, and the like.) because
they “knew better.” In addition, the returnees were subtly reproachful of those who
had not made “the sacrifice” of leaving and had become addicted to traveling. The
returned exiles insisted on telling the stories of exile and the dangers they had faced,
but were bad listeners when those who had stayed behind wanted to tell their own
stories about the sacrifices that had to be made while the exiles were away. Similar
sentiments have been expressed about some of South Africa’s contingent of returned
exiles after they assumed responsibility in important portfolios issues such as health,
education, language and other social services. Their styles of management and some
of the policies pursued have been perceived as being out of step with the realities of
South Africa because they were essentially presiding over a country they no longer
knew.
By reviewing the worldview and culture that was operative before non-Africans
discovered and made themselves “at home” with Africa’s abundant resources, one
gets a sense of where the continent comes from. By evaluating the colonial, Cold
War, and post-independence history of Africa against the background of the values
that prevailed before the tumultuous developments of the last three or four centuries,
one gets a better understanding, and hopefully better appreciation, of the odds
against which Africa has had to survive and find its feet. Maier is therefore correct
when he postulates that, just as it would be unrealistic to argue that the nations of
Africa should attempt to turn back the clock to some past idyll to seek their salvation in the past, it would be unrealistic to maintain that future generations have
nothing to learn from their forefathers.107 Africa is finding new ways in which to
link the old with the new. This process of rediscovery and reconstruction is the focus
of the next section.
The Africian Renaissance: Restoration
or Reconstruction?
The route chosen by the current set of African leaders, or which has perhaps foisted
itself upon them by virtue of those African values that have prevailed, is the subject
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of this final section. Africa’s “burden” after colonialism, the post-independence
period, and the Cold War is multidimensional. The continent’s current leaders have
to undo gruesome mistakes that were made by both outsiders and insiders during all
the phases of the Africa’s modern history while at the same time earning confidence
by the investor community and maintaining the support of their citizens. The
challenge was merely intensified, and not altered, with the acceleration of globalization.108 In addition, the world’s hyperpower, the United States, now also now
expects African nations to fall in line with its ever more diffuse “war” against
terrorism. More fundamentally, however, and yet interlinked with all the other
expectations, there is the challenge that each nation has of managing cultures and
worldviews that are no longer alien to each other, but not yet fully integrated into a
single understanding of how the world works. Amid the persistence (or survival) of
particular worldviews there is the pressures of a United States-dominated worldview,
which brings one back to the cardinal question of identity.
Probably the most important expression of the need for Africa to reaffirm its
own identity came in the form of the speech that former president Nelson Mandela
made to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1994. He started by recalling
the decision of a Roman that Carthage, the ancient city in Africa, should be destroyed. The city was indeed destroyed. Mandela continued by saying that all human
civilization rested on foundations such as the African city of Carthage, but that the
African contribution to civilization was destroyed as well because of slavery, occupation by colonial powers, and the stealing of Africa’s resources. Africa, he said, had
become nothing but beggars. But the ancient pride of the peoples of Africa had asserted itself again in the persons of the various intellectual and political giants that
came from the continent. By their deeds, they had shown that, just like Carthage,
Africa could not be destroyed completely and that, with the liberation of South
Africa, the time had come for a new African Renaissance.
Significantly, Mandela applied typical African rhetoric, almost a traditional praise
song, by referring extensively to Africa’s glorious past prior to colonialism and to
the collective solidarity, destiny, and dignity of Africa. He used the destruction of
Carthage to indicate the destruction of other African bastions of civilizations such as
Egypt, Mali, Benin, Zimbabwe, and so on. With the attainment of South Africa’s
freedom, the “total liberation of Africa” was ensured. Africans, he said, had it in
them to bring about an African Renaissance and ensure the metaphorical rebuilding
of Carthage and actual rebuilding of Africa. And while he did not say so explicitly,
his reference to the ancient civilizations of Africa’s past must have implied that he
also meant that Africa should be drawing from its cultural and philosophical past to
remedy the continent’s afflictions. It was in essence a clarion call for identity,
which, in fact, had commenced before that pivotal speech.
Actually, Mandela had said something new. What made the speech so important,
though, was that he had synthesized various trains of thought that had been circulating in the continent over a number of years and then chose to articulate them at the
highest gathering of African leaders immediately after he had become president.
Mahmoud Mamdani confirms the fact that the rebirth of Africa has been a process
long in coming. By making a comparison with the European Renaissance, he asserts
that the African Renaissance does not have a central parentage, that its genealogy is
as continental as its claim, that it has its roots in pan-Africanism, which in turn was
born of the experience of slavery and colonialism. The African Renaissance was
Africa’s attempt to “go beyond its Dark Ages, to dig deep into its own past, so as to
sculpt it — even mythologize it, but creatively — in order to turn it into a resource
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for a forward movement so decisively so as to cut itself adrift from the Dark
Ages.”109
I propose that an important element of the African Renaissance can be found in
South Africa almost fifty years ago. In the 1960s and 1970s when there was an almost catatonic desperation in Africa about the continent’s fate, a new voice, sadly
silenced too soon, arose to enunciate these sentiments. Steve Biko’s philosophy of
“black consciousness,” which eventually became the Black Consciousness Movement, strove to inculcate in Africans an awareness that they were not the sub-humans
that Westerners had made them to believe. In an article in 1970 where he pointed to
the dehumanization to which Africans had been exposed and the fact that they were
beginning to “yearn” for the white man’s existence, he defined “Black Consciousness” as follows:
All in all the black man has become a shell, a shadow of man, completely defeated,
drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity. This is the first truth, bitter as it may seem, that we have to acknowledge
before we can start on any programme designed to change the status quo. It becomes
more necessary to see the truth as it is if you realise that the only vehicle for change are
these people who have lost their personality. The first step therefore is to make the black
man come to himself; to pump back life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride
and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be
misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth. This is what
we mean by an inward-looking process. This is the definition of “Black Consciousness.”110

I quote the full text because, seen in the light of everything that went before and
the current developments in Africa, it becomes clear how relevant it still is. Biko’s
insistence that the African could only affirm his own identity by affirming his inherent dignity as inheritor of a great heritage is the same as Mandela’s call for the resurrection of Carthage and is therefore a precursor of the African Renaissance.
After Mandela’s speech in Tunis, volumes were written and many conferences
were held about the meaning of the “African Renaissance.” The pessimists ridiculed
Mandela’s vision as a “return to the round huts and footpaths.” The opportunists saw
in it an unbridled sanctioning to “get even” with the perpetrators of everything that
had made Africa the miserable place it had become. The realists thought the speech
was more metaphor than blueprint. Perhaps all the philosophizing about the speech
was a bit overdone, but it started a vigorous debate all over Africa about what it
meant to be African and to be responsible for one’s own destiny now that the outside
powers had actually left the continent and Africa had to fend for itself.
When one analyses the speech, especially in light of Steve Biko’s writings, it is
clear Mandela meant it to be both metaphor and a blueprint. While academics and
civil servants try to figure out what he meant, Mandela himself continues to be a
living example of this vision. He encapsulated the totality of Africa’s traditional
values in the speech: the view of humankind and the rest of the universe as one integrated whole; the solidarity of its people; the imperative for collective, unanimous
action and assumption of collective responsibility; the reverence for the ancestors,
famous and unknown; and the absolute insistence on human dignity. The latter, as
has been said before, is a recurring theme in Mandela’s speeches and writings. Crucially, the speech also included a reality check, which was an entirely new phenomenon amongst Africa’s leaders. He reminded his counterparts that the genocide in
Rwanda had happened just a few months earlier and stood as a “stern and severe
rebuke” to all for having failed to address the issues of economic self-reliance, gov263
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ernance, and stability. And he admonished his counterparts that “we have also spent
time discussing the equally complex questions that bear on the nature and quality of
governance . . . we surely must face the matter squarely that where there is something wrong in the manner in which we govern ourselves, it must be said that the
fault is not in our stars, but in ourselves that we are ill-governed.”
It fell on Thabo Mbeki, then still deputy-president, to carry Mandela’s call
forward. He made it his mission to popularize the concept of the African Renaissance as widely as possible. All government departments had to “think strategically”
and submit reams of proposals on how to implement the vision. In his now famous
“I am an African” speech,111 Mbeki implicitly enunciated the vision of Biko and
responded to Mandela’s call from two years earlier. Repeating the phrase “I am an
African” five times, he alluded to his African ancestry which by now included the
migrants who had left Europe in search of freedom and the Malay community
whose forefathers had come to Africa as slaves. He remembered the tragedies of the
Boer War of 1899-1902 that inflicted such devastation on the Afrikaner community,
the laborers who had come from India and China, and the entire African history in
all its diversity. Significantly, he saw the adoption of the new South African constitution as the amelioration of “the destruction of all sense of self-esteem, the consequent striving to be what one is not” by a people who were “determined to define
for themselves who they are and who they should be . . . to formulate their own
definition of what it means to be African.” I am convinced that, by this speech, he
intended to give all South Africans, irrespective of their color or political history, a
new sense of identity, deeply rooted in Africa.
A comparison between the leadership styles of Mandela and Mbeki reveal that
they may have started from different points of departure, but that being leaders in
Africa have molded the one to transcend strictly “tribal” constructs and the other to
“Africanize” Western dictates.
The uniqueness of Nelson Mandela’s leadership lay in the fact that he managed to
translate the traditional values to function in a completely changed environment. In
his autobiography, he devotes considerable space to his concept of leadership. I have
already referred to some, but a few more points will complete the picture. By virtue
of his father having had four wives, he learned the basics of courtesy and fairness.
He also learned that life was shaped by custom, ritual, and taboo; that neglect of the
ancestors could bring ill-fortune, and that virtue and generosity will be rewarded.
For a leader, listening was more important than talking. Mandela saw himself more
as a shepherd: “He stays behind the flock, letting the most nimble go on ahead,
whereupon the others follow, not realizing that all along they are being directed
from behind. For a nation to move forward, it has to believe in itself.112 A leader
should never take a morally superior tone, that people should not be forced to support him or her, that he should be a unifier and peacemaker. Probably in line with
traditional African thinking that the individual is there to support the group,
Mandela also believed that for a mass movement to succeed, the individual should
not put himself above the movement. Critically, an opponent could be defeated
without dishonoring him and in order to make peace, your enemy should become
your partner.113
By considering the elements of traditional African leadership, as well as the
speeches Mandela made in his self-defense during the Rivonia Trial of 1964114
Andrew Nash115 offers a critique of Mandela’s rule. He describes it as a “tribal
model” of democracy that was essentially pre-capitalist in character.116 This was a
model which was “radically democratic.” Despite Chief Albert Luthuli’s117 claim
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that “tribal organisation is outmoded, and traditional rule by chiefs retards my
people,”118 Nash claims that Mandela’s exposition of the tribal model transformed it
in such a way as to make it an ideological instrument for a democratic accommodation of capitalism in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, his evocation of the tribal past is
made to serve as the basis for the moral stance he took as an individual and forms
part of a moral dramatization of the South African conflict of which Mandela is
both a central protagonist and an active interpreter. Third, through all Mandela’s
statements, he extended the “tribal model” significantly in such a way as to make it a
model of the democratic virtues. Fourth, by constantly referring to the collective
context within which he put his speeches, Mandela stressed the need for the democratic virtues he stood for, but moved further away from the hereditary notions of
leadership toward an interpretation of the collective that was larger than in the tribal
model. Furthermore, Mandela’s model of the past differentiated the initial notion of
Africanism (for blacks only) to one that included other communities as well. For
Nash this distinction was significant because it left space for an account of the role
of the democratic leader in enabling different communities to reconcile their differences harmoniously. While the ANC never explicitly articulated a tribal undertone to
their “inclusive nationalism,” Nash argues that it increasingly formed Mandela’s role
within it and, through his example, the model of democratic leadership within the
ANC. I would go further: this was in all likelihood also the type of leadership he
had in mind when he addressed the African leaders in Tunis. Finally, and most significantly, Mandela’s transformation of the tribal model was to create a moral
framework for South African (and I propose, African) politics in which “African
and western liberal elements were integrated in so instinctive and original a way that
Mandela himself could probably not have said where the one ended and the other
began.” One of the limiting effects of this transformation, Nash feels, was that it set
limits to political clarity. He reminds us that there is no reference to a tribal model
in the constitution of the new South Africa, nor in the program and policies of the
ruling ANC. “But it informs many of the institutions of the new South Africa, and,
above all, the real relationships of power behind the facade of formal democratic
procedures.”
Against the background of Mandela’s leadership that was clearly fashioned long
traditional lines, it has been fascinating to watch Thabo Mbeki, who assumed the
office of president in 1999, as he tries to bridge the divide between his Western
education with its emphasis on individualism and secularism and his African constituency with its religiosity and collective way of operating. He has guided South
Africa into becoming one of the best-managed economies in the developing world
and is in his element when required to philosophize. But also, from the start, he has
been a torchbearer for the ideals of Steve Biko to inculcate into the African a sense
of his own worth. His famous “I am an African” speech on May 8, 1996, is but one
example. But being “back in Africa” has had surprising spin-offs. In good African
fashion he has had to increase his public profile by interacting in a more personal
manner with his constituency in the preferred way: having regular imbizos where
every member of the public can ask him questions and voice their problems, often
without diplomatic reserve.119
On the other hand, through sheer individual tenacity, Mbeki has also brought his
African counterparts on board to adopt the vision of the African Renaissance as a
continent-wide program. Underwritten by the newly established African Union and
supported by the United States, EU, UN, and G8, the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) has prioritized the needs of African development also in the
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international arena.120 Various projects are being planned for which finance will be
provided not through aid, but through partnerships with the rest of the world. The
African leadership will also subject themselves to an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) through which the “policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes, and
standards, and achieve mutually agreed objectives in socio-economic development.”
As part of ensuring the proper functioning of the APRM, the participating states also
“accept that constructive peer dialogue and persuasion would be exercised, where
necessary, in order to encourage improvements in country practices and policies in
compliance with agreed African and international best practices where recommended.”121
Mbeki’s combination of traditional customs with modern, Western imperatives of
governance, has been truly remarkable. When he returned from exile, Mbeki was
seen to be the urbane, Westernized African leader who would “modernize” South
Africa and African politics. Initially, he was described as an enigma. Later on, he
was accused of being aloof, distant from the people.122 He was also seen as being too
academic. These may be seen to be his “Western” attributes. But there is the other
side, to which I have alluded before, namely that the liberation movements in Africa
had become their followers’ “tribe” and that traditional customs found their way into
the functioning of these movements. Allister Sparks contends that Mbeki’s development as a leader is the result of him having been “brought up more by the movement than by his parents, that he was educated for a role that he himself was never
allowed to choose or define, and whose whole life was controlled and directed and
dedicated for him with little thought for his own wishes. He became in every respect
an instrument of the movement.”123 But, as the examples above illustrate, Mbeki is
obviously managing to bridge the divide between his Western liberal education and
his African roots. He has become, like Mandela, the personal example of the vision
he stands for.
But Mbeki lives in what Sparks calls a “bad neighborhood.” Although he himself
has never articulated which way he prefers, Mbeki’s Western mind may prefer the
“quicker” (but, history shows, not necessarily tidier) recipe. But his tireless efforts
to bring peace to Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte
d’Ivoire and, yes, Liberia and Zimbabwe undoubtedly have had to take into account
the reality of the African worldview. As has been seen earlier, this means that the
resolution of problems should be managed collectively; that the person you regard as
instrumental to change should not be humiliated, that he/she should not blamed or
attacked in public; and that consensus-seeking should be paramount. So far, the
results have begun to show everywhere. Progress in Zimbabwe is still outstanding.
But when analyzed within the context of the different worldviews that Mbeki has to
placate while at the same time ensuring ultimate success, his scope of choices is far
more limited than his critics presume. And it is against this background that his
handling of Zimbabwe, and Mugabe in particular, becomes clearer. Western demands are that he act more forcefully, while the African mind dictates veneration of
tradition, of elderly people, of the consensus-seeking model, and of the spiritual
connections to land. If he followed the Western pattern, especially the American
way, Mbeki would be expected to launch vitriolic diatribes against his neighbor,
implement sanctions, close the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe, switch
off the lights,124 and ultimately invade the country militarily. He has refused to do
so. I submit that, apart from the realities of Zimbabwe’s political situation,125 Mbeki
is consciously affirming the African values I have endeavored to explain in this
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paper. And if the other examples and news reports at the time of writing are anything to go by, the next president to be given a ritualistic and dignified send-off into
exile could be Mr. Mugabe.
Since Mandela delivered that speech in Tunis, the transformation of leadership
and society in Africa has continued. It is everywhere to be seen and the application
of African methodologies, infused by the traditional worldview, is evolving with
increasing boldness. Yet, practices that are traceable to Western origins are equally
discernable. This paper would be incomplete if I failed to cite some important examples where a compelling (some call it enchanting) convergence is emerging between the traditional African worldview and the Western values of rationality, linear
thinking, trust in the discoveries of the natural sciences, and the preeminence of
individual effort. This accommodation between the two cultures is seen from the
leadership through to ordinary people.
An integral part of the political settlement that led to South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994 was the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that would investigate the human rights abuses perpetrated during the
apartheid years. Desmond Tutu ascribes the eventual functioning, report, and outcome of the commission, and the legal framework within which it functioned, to the
influence of ubuntu and the values that came from it: the inherent dignity of every
individual as part of humanity; the spiritual nature of the TRC’s work through continuous prayer and intercession; the imperative for collective forgiveness in order to
heal the entire nation; proper burial ceremonies for the bodies of those who had
been killed in the struggle against apartheid; the public nature of the proceedings
and the catharsis it had brought about in the victims who testified; and the need for
consensus all through the commission’s work. Tutu often described the
Commission’s raison d’être as “justice with mercy.”
It is not only in South Africa that African traditions are serving to heal trauma
where other methods have failed. Very often, it is not only leaders who pave the way
to reconciliation, but ordinary professionals. Newspapers, academic journals, and
books are full of the re-emergence of traditional Africa, albeit mediated through
modern concepts. Already in 1996, Palesa Makhale-Mahlangu126 has pleaded for a
“relevant interpretation of Eurocentric based models” in the African context. African
characteristics have been eroded but are not “totally extinct”; they are “deeply and
innately embedded in the African persona” and should therefore serve as a basis for
social and psychological counseling and conflict resolution. Some of the challenges
faced by psychologists in Africa include language, time, and the age of patients.
Makhale-Mahlangu sheds light on the therapeutic models that have had to be adjusted to the African context. More often than not, the traditional customs of ritual
cleansing, reconciliation, burial, and prayer are more successful and enduring than
the individualistic, impersonal Western methods such as medicines (antidepressants,
and the like), individual counseling, psychoanalysis, meditation, and group therapy
among strangers in an impersonal environment. Social workers, psychologists and
religious leaders that were trained in Western methodologies all report that their
“scientific” training may help them to analyze a problem, but that their African roots
help them to devise a more holistic solution. They also find themselves approaching
issues from a much broader frame of reference. Similar tales of healing appear in
Maier’s Into the House of the Ancestors in which the scenarios range from restoring
village peace in Mozambique and treating returning child soldiers all over Africa, to
involving traditional healers in South Africa to address the scourge of AIDS. These
remedies are found from the San people of Botswana and Namibia127 to Angola
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where returning combatants undergo cleansing rituals to receive them back into their
communities.128 It is striking how many prominent Africans turn up at these rituals.
It goes further: the Africanization of Christianity has long been a fact, but in 2000,
the Roman Catholic archbishop in South Africa suggested that a libation of blood (a
ritual pouring as a symbolic sacrifice honoring the ancestors of black Africans),
should be incorporated into the local Catholic liturgies such as the mass as a way of
“inculturation” according to which indigenous culture and values are a means of
presenting, reformulating, and living the Christian faith.129
Combining capitalist imperatives with the philosophy of ubuntu is also now being
tested in African commerce. Many entrepreneurs are finding new ways to secure
capital while developing skills by interacting with communities (societies or clusters
of investors) instead of with individuals only.130
The whole repertoire of methods that are being employed to deal with Africa’s
challenges and opportunities, of which only a few were touched in this section, directs the analyst to review the history and present realities in Africa. If we want to
be true to the Western requirement for basing conclusions upon verifiable facts, we
need to factor the fact of the reassertion of traditional African worldview and culture into our studies. I would contend that, by examining more current African leaders from the perspective I have advanced, it would become evident that Nelson
Mandela and Thabo Mbeki are not the only representatives of the African Renaissance as described in this section. While “old,” traditional Africa can never be resurrected, there is ample evidence that the core values of its worldview and culture are
indeed being restored, yet in a creative manner which also recognize the value and
utility of the Western frame of reference. African leaders in all walks of life are
paving the way for a new identity where the ubuntu spirit of “I am because we are,”
meets “Everyone for himself.”
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to present Africa’s heritage through the prism of the
worldview and culture that existed prior to colonialism, the Cold War, and the three
decades following independence. I have highlighted the traditional belief that man is
part of a religious universe; that time is controlled by man and not the other way
around; that reverence shown to the elderly is fundamentally linked with the belief
that the departed still have an interest in the living; that the individual is subject to
the interests of the group; and that the collective approach to life is dominant. I have
also elected not to revert to more contemporary, “politically correct” terms such as
“Euroamerican” for “Western,” “unfortunate policies towards Africa” for the
“scramble for Africa,” and so forth. I have done so deliberately because political
correctness often leads to meaningless platitudes that may be soft on the conscience
but that dim the facts.
In the second section, the colonial, Cold War, and post-independence history of
Africa was placed within the context of traditional African worldview. I sought to
indicate how this period brought about a bewildering friction of ideologies, systems,
and practices and what effect it had on the political, economic, and social wellbeing
of the continent. The impact of exile on the leadership of Africa was appraised in
some detail with a call for further study in this regard. In the third section, the examples of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki were forwarded as role models for the
way in which contemporary African leaders are traversing the divide between traditional Africa and the individualistic, materialistic West. I submitted that Africa’s
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traditional worldview, while not being resurrected in total, was being reconstructed
to answer to post-traditional demands but that scientific analysis that originated in
the West was being reconstructed as well to suit African sensibilities. It should be
apparent that I don’t subscribe to the notion of a clash of civilizations. Rather, I
suggest that, at least in Africa, there is the concerted meeting of minds that should
be taken seriously.
Finally, if we believe that conflict starts in the minds of people and that it can be
stopped only in the minds of people, it is vital that we take cognizance of what informs those minds and work with what people believe, not with what we want them
to believe. By providing some insight into the worldview and culture of Africa, as it
is being reconstructed, I hope to have prompted a more realistic approach to the
continent and its leaders. For Africa’s leaders, the ultimate test will be whether they
will be able to emulate Mandela’s success in what Nash termed the formation or
recognition of contradictions between the traditional and the modern, and sustain
them. It should be evident by now that, by having reviewed traditional African culture, what was true for Mandela,131 is equally true for today’s African leaders: their
greatness and limitations stem from the same source. There is enough evidence that
Steve Biko’s prophecy may indeed be fulfilled: despite all the atrocities it has been
subjected to and party to, Africa’s contribution to the world will be in the field of
human relationship, giving the world a more human face. z 132
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